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AN UNCOMMON CARRIER: THE FCC’S UNINTENDED
EFFECTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL USE TAXATION
Maricarmen Perez-Vargas
Abstract: The constitutional use taxation framework, which regulates the circumstances
under which states can require out-of-state sellers to collect and remit use taxes on products
sold for use within the state, has not been examined by Congress or the Supreme Court since
the 1990s, and then only to reaffirm a rule that had been in place since the 1960s. Since the
1960s, the Supreme Court has held that states can only collect use taxes from sellers that
have a physical presence within the state and whose connections to the state are beyond
connections via common carriers. The Court interpreted this rule in the context of mail-order
businesses in order to prevent states from taxing retailers that were simply mailing
merchandise into the state, which the Court reasoned did not significantly use state resources.
This bright-line rule has created settled expectations that businesses will not be subject to use
taxation in a state where they do not have a physical presence, and where their only contacts
with the state are through mail or common carrier.
In 2013, the New York State Court of Appeals deviated from the first half of this rule by
holding that internet advertisers that were paid commission could constitute a “physical
presence” that could subject a business to use taxation. The Supreme Court denied certiorari,
and this decision reinvigorated the debate about what “physical presence” means in the
modern economy.
The second half of the rule, that sellers must have connections with a state beyond
connections through a “common carrier,” has traditionally not required much analysis by
courts or legal scholars, since historically, a physical presence, by definition, provided a
relationship with a state beyond one established exclusively through common carriers. In
2015, however, the Federal Communications Commission designated internet service
providers as common carriers. This Comment argues that internet service providers’ common
carrier designation precludes states from collecting use taxes from out-of-state sellers whose
only connections with the state are through the internet, as was the case in New York.
Furthermore, this Comment explores the implications of the policy goals of the new
executive administration under Donald Trump,1 which has initiated the reversal of the
internet’s classification as a common carrier.2 A reversal of the Federal Communications
Commission’s rule would conceivably reinstate the internet as a means through which sellers
would be able to establish a physical presence within a state.

 J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Washington School of Law. With thanks to Professor
Kathryn Watts for her guidance and the staff of Washington Law Review for their thoughtful and
patient editorial work.
1. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 12, 2014, 10:58 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/532608358508167168? [https://perma.cc/F794-TTTS].
2. See In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 32 FCC Rcd. 4434, 4435 (2017).
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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the New York State Court of Appeals did something that
courts in the United States had not done since before the 1960s: impose
use tax collection obligations on sellers that did not have physical
presences within the state of New York.3 Although the sellers,
Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) and Overstock.com, Inc. (Overstock),
appealed, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.4 The Overstock decision
sparked a debate that had been largely dormant since the early 1990s—
what does a “physical presence” mean in the modern economy?5
Ever since the 1960s, states have been unable to collect use taxes
from sellers without a physical presence within their borders.6 Courts
have consistently upheld this bright-line rule in order to comply with the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause.7
Some states have recently attempted to relax this rule in order to recoup
lost revenue due to the development of the internet economy. 8 In 2013,
the state of New York subjected Amazon and Overstock to use taxation
collection obligations, finding a physical presence through the sellers’
advertisements on websites that had owners located in New York.9
The internet’s recent classification as a common carrier through the
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2015 Open Internet
Order,10 however, could preclude courts from reasoning that internetbased connections can produce a physical presence subjecting the seller
to use taxation collection obligations within a state. Because the United
States Supreme Court has recognized and upheld a distinction between
sellers with a physical presence within a state and sellers that “do no
more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or common
carrier,” if the internet is a common carrier, then sellers whose only
connections with a state are through the internet cannot establish a
physical presence through that connection.11

3. See Overstock.com, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013).
4. See Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 682
(2013) (cert. denied).
5. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
6. See id. at 318; Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
7. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318; Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758; Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 625.
8. See Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 623.
9. See id.
10. See In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter
2015 Open Internet Order].
11. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
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Notably, the Open Internet Order is not necessarily permanent. The
Order has been challenged by litigants.12 Furthermore, the FCC, now
headed by Ajit Pai, recently proposed a new rule that would revoke the
common carrier classification of internet service providers (ISPs).13
This Comment explores the impact of the FCC’s 2015 classification
of the internet as a common carrier on the current constitutional use
taxation framework.14 Part II describes the historical development of the
constitutional use taxation framework through Supreme Court decisions.
Part III describes the modern approach and the anomalous decision made
by the New York State Court of Appeals allowing the state to tax sellers
without a traditional physical presence within the state.15 Part IV gives
background on the FCC’s designation of the internet as a common
carrier and discusses potential changes to this designation under the new
presidential administration.16 Part V analyzes the effects of this
reclassification on constitutional use taxation, and demonstrates the
significance of the common carrier language in the National Bellas Hess
v. Department of Revenue17 rule when applied to the internet. This
Comment concludes that under the current administrative framework,
decisions such as the one in Overstock.com, Inc. v. New York State
Department of Taxation and Finance18 are precluded by the internet’s
status as a common carrier. This Comment notes, however, that this
status is tenuous as it is dependent on impermanent administrative
actions.

12. Simone A. Friedlander, Note, Net Neutrality and the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 905, 924 (2016) (citing 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5635).
13. See In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 32 FCC Rcd. 4434, 4435 (2017). For a discussion on
the comment process for this proposed rule, see Devin Coldewey, Today Is Your Last Chance to
Comment on the Proposal to Kill Net Neutrality, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/30/today-is-your-last-chance-to-comment-on-the-proposal-to-killnet-neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/5BNK-E8MG].
14. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5604.
15. See Overstock.com, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013).
16. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5601.
17. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
18. 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013).
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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
USE TAXATION: A STRUGGLE BETWEEN STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EVOLVING ECONOMY

Courts have struggled throughout United States history with
identifying the boundaries of the individual states’ power to tax.19 The
Supreme Court has attempted to balance two competing goals. First, the
Supreme Court seeks to prevent protectionism, defined as “regulatory
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening
out-of-state competitors.”20 One scholar commented that “[t]he
quintessential instrument of protectionism is the protective tariff, a duty
on imports of a certain good imposed for the purpose of securing a
greater share of the home market for domestic producers of the good.”21
Second, the Supreme Court seeks to allow state governments to collect
duly owed taxes. Part II of this Comment focuses on this historical
development of one particular type of protective tariff, state use taxation,
and the constitutional framework that limits it. It will discuss the
doctrinal limitation on states’ power to tax out-of-state businesses: the
Dormant Commerce Clause, and the historical framework that existed
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Bellas Hess.
A.

The Dormant Commerce Clause: The Doctrinal Limitation on
States’ Power to Tax Out-of-State Businesses

The Dormant Commerce Clause limits the ability of states to tax
businesses that are not located within their borders.22 The Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution vests the power to regulate
commerce “among the several states” in Congress.23 The Dormant
Commerce Clause precludes states from unduly burdening interstate
commerce.24 If a state action is protectionist or isolationist, particularly
when it facially discriminates against out-of-state goods, services, or
economic entities, then it violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.25
19. See James L. Buchwalter, Construction and Application of Dormant Commerce Clause, U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3—Supreme Court Cases, 41 AM. L. REP. FED. 2d 1, § 2 (2009).
20. Id. § 11.
21. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (1986).
22. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274 (1977); Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. See id.
25. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
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To analyze whether a state action violates the Dormant Commerce
Clause, the Court first inquires whether the law facially discriminates
against interstate commerce.26 If a law is facially discriminatory, it is
virtually per se invalid.27 Absent facial discrimination, however, the law
will be “upheld unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the [local] benefits.”28
In the context of interstate taxation, determining facial discrimination
is fairly simple. If a state attempts to tax businesses that are not located
within the state at a higher rate than those located within the state, that
constitutes facial discrimination and renders the law per se invalid.29 For
state taxes that burden in-state businesses as well as out-of-state
businesses equally, however, the analysis is more complicated.
B.

Constitutional Use Taxation Analysis Before Bellas Hess: A
“Minimum Contacts” Approach

Taxation of out-of-state businesses is permissible under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, to an extent. The framework for evaluating the
burden and whether it is excessive has evolved over time. Before the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bellas Hess, use taxes were
analyzed similarly to the personal jurisdiction minimum contacts
analysis.30 Use taxes are state taxes applied to the use of goods
purchased from out-of-state sellers within a given state, as opposed to
sales taxes, which are applied to sales made by businesses within their
state of residence.31
The minimum contacts analysis for personal jurisdiction allows states
to subject residents of other states to their jurisdiction if the resident has
sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state, such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”32 Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland33 is a good
example of the pre-Bellas Hess “minimum contacts” approach.34 In

26. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008).
27. See id.
28. Id. at 338–39 (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
29. See id. at 338.
30. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 342–43 (1954).
31. See id. at 343.
32. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
33. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
34. See id. at 342–47.
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Miller Bros., the Supreme Court evaluated whether the state of Maryland
could require a Delaware corporation to recover and remit use taxes for
goods sold in Delaware to Maryland residents for use within Maryland.35
Because the Delaware corporation did not solicit or exploit the consumer
market in Maryland, and did not sell products within the state of
Maryland, it could not be required to collect and remit use taxes to the
state of Maryland.36 The Court held that, in order to tax an out-of-state
seller, there must be “some definite link, some minimum connection,
between a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax.”37
This rule was reaffirmed by the Court in Scripto v. Carson,38 holding
that there must be some “minimum connection” between a state and the
“person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.”39 In Scripto, the Court
held that Florida could constitutionally impose a use tax collection
obligation on a Georgia seller because the seller had ten salesmen
conducting continuous local solicitation in the state of Florida.40 This
solicitation was seen as a sufficient “minimum connection” with the
state for use taxation purposes.41
This was the dominant approach of the Court up until 1967 when
Bellas Hess was decided.42 The rise of mail-order retail changed the
economic landscape in a way that necessitated a change in the
constitutional use taxation framework.43 A bright-line rule that could
afford clarity to sellers and states was desirable, which is what the Court
announced in Bellas Hess.44
C.

Bellas Hess Introduces the Physical Presence Requirement

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bellas Hess represented a departure
from the vague “minimum connection” approach for constitutional use
taxation. In Bellas Hess, the Court considered a use tax that the state of
Illinois was attempting to impose on an out-of-state seller without a

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 344–45.
362 U.S. 207 (1960).
Id. at 210–11 (quoting Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344–45).
See id. at 210–12.
See id.
See Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
See id.
Id.
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physical presence within the state.45 The action was to recover taxes
assessed by the Illinois Use Tax.46 The seller, a mail-order business, did
not maintain “any office, distribution house, sales house, warehouse or
any other place of business; it [did] not have in Illinois any agent,
salesman, canvasser, solicitor or other type of representative to sell or
take orders, to deliver merchandise, to accept payments, or to service
merchandise.”47 The seller did not own property or advertise within the
state of Illinois.48 The tax Illinois attempted to impose taxed businesses
soliciting orders within Illinois using catalogues or other advertisements
where the products that were sold were ultimately used within the state
of Illinois.49
Although the Court did not overrule its previous “minimum
connection” holdings, it clarified that a requirement to establish a
sufficient connection was a physical presence within the taxing state.50
The Court held that a state may not collect use taxes from sellers without
“retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State” that “do no more
than communicate with customers in the State by mail or common
carrier as part of a general interstate business.”51 The holding
specifically precluded states from taxing mail-order businesses simply
for selling goods to customers located within the state.52
The Court reiterated situations where it had allowed a state to tax an
out-of-state seller in the past, such as where local agents arranged the
sales or where the mail-order seller maintained local retail stores.53 The
Court justified these impositions because “[i]n those situations the outof-state seller was plainly accorded the protection and services of the
taxing State.”54 The Court cited Scripto as the case that represented “the
furthest constitutional reach to date of a State’s power to deputize an
out-of-state retailer as its collection agent for a use tax.”55

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 754.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 755.
50. Id. at 758.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 758.
53. Id. at 757 (citing Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1948); Gen. Trading Co. v.
State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 355 (1944); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939)).
54. Id.
55. Id. (discussing Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210–11 (1960)).
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Turning to the facts at hand, the Court stated that it had “never held
that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon
a seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by
common carrier or the United States mail.”56 The Court reasoned that
this was because such sellers were not receiving the types of benefits
from the states in question that would justify taxation.57
The Court thus created a new, clear distinction: out-of-state sellers
could only be taxed where they had a physical presence within the state
and their relationship with the state was more than a relationship through
mail or common carrier.58
D.

The Modern Understanding: Complete Auto, Quill, and the
“Substantial Nexus”

Following the Court’s decision in Bellas Hess, confusion persisted as
to how to apply the physical presence requirement. This was partially
due to a more formalistic approach that the Court had applied in
Freeman v. Hewitt59 and Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor.60
In Freeman, Indiana sought to impose an inheritance tax when a
trustee of an Indiana estate instructed his local stockbroker, located
within New York, to sell certain securities.61 The Court “announced a
blanket prohibition against any state taxation imposed directly on an
interstate transaction.”62
A few years later, in Spector, the Court reaffirmed the prohibition
against taxation of the “privilege” of doing business.63 The Spector
Court analyzed a Connecticut state tax imposed on a Missouri
corporation that “engaged exclusively in interstate trucking.”64 The
Court struck down the tax, observing that “[t]his Court heretofore has
struck down, under the Commerce Clause, state taxes upon the privilege
of carrying on a business that was exclusively interstate in character.”65

56. Id. at 758.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
60. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
61. Freeman, 329 U.S. at 250–51.
62. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (discussing Freeman, 329
U.S. at 253).
63. Spector, 340 U.S. at 603.
64. Id. at 603–04.
65. Spector, 340 U.S. at 609–10 (citing Freeman, 329 U.S. 249).
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Due to the confusion that persisted in courts attempting to consolidate
these precedents, the Court clarified the law in its decision in Complete
Auto v. Brady.66 The Court observed, “[w]e noted probable jurisdiction
in order to consider anew the applicable principles in this troublesome
area.”67 In Complete Auto, the Court held that a Mississippi tax on the
“privilege of doing business” within the state did not violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause.68 The Court announced a four-part test used
to evaluate the constitutionality of a use tax imposed on an out-of-state
seller: the tax needed to (1) be applied to interstate activity that had a
“substantial nexus” with the taxing state; (2) be fairly apportioned; (3)
not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) be fairly related to
the services provided by the state.69
In its decision in Complete Auto, the Court explicitly overruled its
decision in Spector.70 The Court did not, however, overrule its previous
decision in Bellas Hess, implying that the physical presence rule
announced in that decision was still valid.71 The litigants in Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota,72 however, challenged this implication.73
In Quill, the Court again considered the constitutionality of use
taxation collection obligations imposed on out-of-state sellers in the
context of mail-order sales.74 “This case, like National Bellas
Hess . . . involves a State’s attempt to require an out-of-state mail-order
house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State to
collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State.”75
North Dakota sought a declaratory judgment against Quill Corporation
stating that it was obligated to collect and remit applicable use taxes to
North Dakota, despite the fact that Quill Corporation was a Delaware
corporation with offices and warehouses in Illinois.76
North Dakota argued that the Court’s decision in Complete Auto had
overruled the physical presence rule established in Bellas Hess.77
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 274.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 289.
Id.
504 U.S. 298 (1992).
See id. at 301–04.
Id.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 310.
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Complete Auto’s four-part test for constitutional use taxation did not
mention the physical presence requirement articulated in Bellas Hess,
using instead the “substantial nexus” language.78 The Court clarified,
however, that Complete Auto did not render Bellas Hess obsolete.79
Although the Court did overrule the due-process analysis that the Court
had used in Bellas Hess,80 it maintained that a physical presence was still
required in order to establish a substantial nexus within a taxing state.81
The Court noted that Bellas Hess was not inconsistent with Complete
Auto and its recent cases, stating that under Complete Auto’s four-part
test, “Bellas Hess concern[ed] the first of these tests and [stood] for the
proposition that a vendor whose only contacts with the taxing State
[were] by mail or common carrier lack[ed] the ‘substantial nexus’
required by the Commerce Clause.”82
The Court distinguished Bellas Hess from the other cases the Court
had overruled in its decision in Complete Auto.83 The Court clarified that
“Complete Auto rejected Freeman and Spector’s formal distinction
between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ taxes on interstate commerce because that
formalism allowed the validity of statutes to hinge on ‘legal
terminology,’ ‘draftsmanship and phraseology.’”84 The Court renounced
the Freeman approach because it “attach[ed] constitutional significance
to a semantic difference.”85 Bellas Hess, on the other hand, made a
distinction between mail-order sellers with a physical presence in the
taxing state and mail-order sellers who only communicate with
customers in the state by mail or common carrier as a part of their
general interstate business.86 The Court concluded that its reasoning in
recent cases did not compel it to reject the rule that Bellas Hess
78. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
79. Quill, 504 U.S. at 310.
80. Id. at 308, 312 (holding that, to comply with the Due Process Clause of the Federal
Constitution, a physical presence within a taxing state is not required because the Due Process
Clause seeks to protect different interests than the Commerce Clause. “[T]o the extent that our
decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the
imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded by developments in
the law of due process . . . . [d]espite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical”).
81. Id. at 311.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 310 (first discussing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 285; and then discussing Freeman v.
Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946)).
85. Id. (quoting Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 285) (discussing Freeman, 329 U.S. at 250–51).
86. Id. at 311 (quoting Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 559
(1997)).
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established in the area of sales and use taxes.87 “To the contrary, the
continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine and the
principles of stare decisis indicate[ed] that the Bellas Hess rule
remain[ed] good law.”88
Thus, Bellas Hess, Complete Auto, and Quill taken together forged a
new, modern understanding of constitutional use taxation. Bellas Hess
created the physical presence rule.89 Complete Auto created the four-part
test, beginning with the requirement for a “substantial nexus.”90 Quill
consolidated these two rulings to clarify that a substantial nexus required
a physical presence, preserving the Bellas Hess ruling as the definition
of the first prong of Complete Auto’s four-part test.91
II.

THE MODERN APPROACH IN THE MODERN ECONOMY:
CONSTITUTIONAL USE TAXATION AND THE RISE OF THE
INTERNET ECONOMY

In Bellas Hess and Quill, the Court re-shaped the constitutional use
taxation framework in light of a significant and sharp change in the
economy: the rise of mail-order businesses.92 This Part discusses the
application of the physical presence rule to the internet economy,
showing that there is controversy over whether the rule should remain in
place in the modern economy.
A.

The Internet Economy Has Changed the Landscape of
Constitutional Use Taxation

The economy has changed significantly since Quill was decided in
1992. This change has introduced a debate regarding the propriety of the
physical presence rule. Some defend the physical presence rule, arguing
that it provides certainty for both states and retailers,93 ensures free trade
among states,94 and it would be inappropriate for the Court to change
this longstanding doctrine.95 Those who oppose the physical presence
87. Id. at 317.
88. Id.
89. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
90. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
91. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).
92. Quill, 504 U.S. at 317; Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
93. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314–15.
94. Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) (citing McLeod v. J.E.
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944)).
95. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314–15.
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rule argue that it is outdated and inappropriate in the context of the
internet economy.96
Since 1992, “[t]he [i]nternet has caused far-reaching systematic and
structural changes in the economy.”97 In 2011, “nearly 70% of American
consumers shopped online.”98 Retailers can now easily and affordably
conduct business in many states with a physical location in just one.99
This, in turn, has caused states to attempt to circumvent the physical
presence requirement to tax businesses selling products into the states
without being physically located in the states.100 This is exactly the type
of change in the economy that the Court confronted both in Bellas Hess
and in Quill: simply substitute “mail-order” retailer with “online
retailer.”101
The Court has persisted in its application of the physical presence rule
despite a “wholesale change[]” in the economy.102 In Quill, the North
Dakota Supreme Court had decided that changes in both the economy
and the law made it inappropriate to follow Bellas Hess.103 The United
States Supreme Court noted the remarkable growth of the mail-order
business “from a relatively inconsequential market niche” in 1967 to a
“goliath” market with annual sales reaching “the staggering figure of
$183.3 billion in 1989.”104 The Supreme Court acknowledged these
changes, but ultimately affirmed the physical presence rule despite
them.105 In his dissent, Justice White observed that “in today’s economy,

96. See, e.g., John L. Mikesell, Remote Vendors and American Sales and Use Taxation: The
Balance Between Fixing the Problem and Fixing the Tax, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1273, 1278 (2000) (“The
Quill physical presence line may be ‘bright’ in the eyes of the judiciary, but the new forms of
remote commerce have blurred the line enough to make it an un-reliable standard if the sales and
use tax is to be fair, non-distorting of channels of commerce, and productive.”).
97. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
98. Id. (citing PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, UNDERSTANDING HOW U.S. ONLINE SHOPPERS
ARE RESHAPING THE RETAIL EXPERIENCE 3 (2012)).
99. Curtis Mitchell, Why Traditional Retailers Are Feeling the Ecommerce Heat, WIRED (June
7, 2013), http://insights.wired.com/profiles/blogs/6-reasons-why-traditional-retailers-are-feelingtheecommerce [https://perma.cc/X34Q-V5BZ].
100. See Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 625–26
(N.Y. 2013).
101. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992); Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
102. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 303 (quoting State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203,
213 (N.D. 1991)).
103. Id. at 301.
104. Id. at 302 (quoting Heitkamp, 470 N.W.2d at 208–09).
105. Id. at 301–02.
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physical presence frequently has very little to do with a transaction a
State might seek to tax.”106 The same debate has emerged in light of the
rise of the internet economy.
The ease of conducting interstate commerce through the internet has
given rise to prevalent online retailers.107 Large and small businesses
have been able to easily increase the volume of their sales throughout the
country through the internet.108 As a result, physical presence has
become increasingly difficult to define.
1.

Arguments Favoring the Physical Presence Rule

Those favoring the physical presence rule in light of the modern
economy argue that it provides predictability and foreseeability both for
states and for businesses, it is consistent with the Commerce Clause, and
stare decisis favors preserving the rule.109 Proponents of the rule cite
Quill, which stated, “[u]ndue burdens on interstate commerce may be
avoided not only by a case-by-case evaluation of the actual burdens
imposed by particular regulations or taxes, but also, in some situations,
by the demarcation of a discrete realm of commercial activity that is free
from interstate taxation.”110
Furthermore, the purpose of the Commerce Clause is to protect “free
trade among the several states.”111 The Court in Quill observed that “the
Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement are informed not so much
by concerns about fairness for the individual defendant as by structural
concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national
economy.”112
Additionally, stare decisis cautions the Court against lightly setting
aside precedent such as the physical presence rule.113 When the Court
does consider overruling itself, “its judgment is customarily informed by
a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations . . . .”114 These
considerations include whether the rule is unworkable, whether the rule
106. Id. at 328 (White, J., dissenting).
107. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
108. Mitchell, supra note 99.
109. See generally Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
110. Id. at 314–15.
111. Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) (citing McLeod v. J.E.
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944)).
112. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
113. See id. at 317.
114. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
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“is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling,” and whether “related principles of law
have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant
of abandoned doctrine.”115 The physical presence rule’s simplicity,
decades-long history, and consistent application are arguments cited to
support stare decisis in this instance.116 One scholar has observed that
“[t]he potential administrative snafus resulting from the taxation of ecommerce are similar to those recognized in Bellas Hess. Currently there
are approximately 7,000 taxing entities throughout the United States
with varying tax rates and exemptions, and each is capable of imposing a
sales or use tax.”117
Supporters of the physical presence requirement also argue that it
would be Congress’s role, not the Court’s, to change this established
rule. Supporters cite Quill, where the Court commented:
[O]ur decision is made easier by the fact that the underlying
issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified to
resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to
resolve. No matter how we evaluate the burdens that use taxes
impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to
disagree with our conclusions.118
2.

Arguments Against the Physical Presence Rule

There are some who argue that the physical presence rule is out of
date in the context of the modern internet economy. 119 One scholar has
observed that “[t]he Quill physical presence line may be ‘bright’ in the
eyes of the judiciary, but the new forms of remote commerce have
blurred the line enough to make it an unreliable standard if the sales and
use tax is to be fair, non-distorting of channels of commerce, and
productive.”120 In particular, those who oppose the physical presence
rule in the modern economy argue that it is difficult to define and apply

115. Id. at 854–55.
116. See, e.g., W. Ray Williams, The Role of Caesar in the Next Millennium? Taxation of ECommerce: An Overview and Analysis, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1703, 1716 (2001).
117. Id.
118. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946)).
119. See, e.g., Mikesell, supra note 96, at 1278 (“The problem is that economic and
technological change has made untenable the physical presence rule that National Bellas Hess, Inc.
v. Department of Revenue . . . and Quill v. North Dakota . . . established to determine when remote
vendors must register as sales and use tax collectors.”).
120. Id. at 1279.
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in the context of the internet and prevents states from collecting duly
owed taxes, causing significant deficits in state budgets.121
One example of the potential ambiguity created by the physical
presence rule is its role in retailer-teacher book programs with no formal
agency or representative agreements. At least three states currently allow
a physical presence to be established on the basis of an “implied agency
relationship” even if the agent is not formally employed by or dependent
on income from the seller.122 However, at least two other states claim
that physical presence cannot be established for nearly identical
relationships.123 This ambiguity pales in comparison to confusion that
exists in relation to large online retailers.124
Some argue that this test, in the context of the rise of the internet
economy, hurts the ability of states to collect duly owed use taxes.125 In
his concurrence in the Brohl decision, Justice Kennedy observed that the
physical presence test “inflict[s] extreme harm and unfairness on the
States.”126
There has been a correlation in the rise of internet retailers and the
decline of state revenues.127 The National Conference of State
Legislatures “estimates that states lost out on $23.2 billion in revenue in
2012 due to their inability to collect sales taxes from online
purchases.”128 More traditional brick-and-mortar retailers complain

121. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
122. See Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 207 Cal. App. 3d 734
(1989); In re Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc., 920 P.2d 947 (Kan. 1996); Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v.
Comm’r of Revenue Servs., 38 A.3d 1183, 1197 (Conn. 2012).
123. See Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Treasury, 567 N.W.2d 692, 694–95
(Mich. 1997); Pledger v. Troll Book Clubs, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 389, 392–93 (Ark. 1994).
124. See Direct Mktg., 135 S. Ct. at 1128 (discussing a state statute that would require online
retailers to provide the state with a list of customers who had purchased their goods within the state
so that the state could collect the use taxes that were owed).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1134 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. See, e.g., CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUALIZATION, REVENUE ESTIMATE: ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
AND MAIL ORDER SALES 7 tbl.3 (rev. 2013) (estimating that the State of California is able to collect
only four percent of the use taxes due on out-of-state vendors).
128. Darla Mercado, The Holiday Is Over: Amazon Will Collect Sales Taxes Nationwide on
April 1, CNBC (Mar. 24, 2017, 2:12 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/24/the-holiday-is-overamazon-will-collect-sales-taxes-nationwide-on-april-1.html
[https://perma.cc/N84K-WGAW]
(citing Collecting E-Commerce Taxes: E-Fairness Legislation, NCSL (Nov. 14, 2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/29/technology/amazon-sales-tax/http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscalpolicy/collecting-ecommerce-taxes-an-interactive-map.aspx#2
[https://perma.cc/Q9JD-XKVV]
(compiling data for state-by-state sales tax figures)).
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about what they view as an unfair advantage held by online retailers.129
Retailers that used to require a physical presence within a state in order
to do a substantial amount of business in that state no longer need such a
physical presence to have a substantial economic presence.130 “In 2008,
e-commerce sales . . . totaled $3.16 trillion per year in the United
States.”131 The rise in internet retailers that are exempt from state taxes
has prompted both state legislatures and traditional brick-and-mortar
retailers to lobby for a legislative solution.132 Although there have been
several efforts to change the use taxation framework through
legislation,133 these bills “have stalled in Congress, despite bipartisan
support.”134
B.

Testing the Physical Presence Rule in the Internet Economy:
Overstock

The broader debate surrounding the benefits and disadvantages of the
physical presence rule was ongoing when New York’s highest court
upheld a use tax statute that applied to out-of-state sellers without
offices, personnel, or retail locations in New York in Overstock.135 The
court found a sufficient “physical presence” where the sellers (Overstock
and Amazon) contracted with New York residents to refer customers.136
The majority’s approach did not contravene the physical presence
rule, observing that “[t]he world has changed dramatically in the last two
129. Chris Isidore, Amazon to Start Collecting State Sales Tax Everywhere, CNN TECH (Mar.
29,
2017,
2:59
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/29/technology/amazon-sales-tax/
[https://perma.cc/YD7G-SFHS].
130. See, e.g., CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUALIZATION, supra note 127, at 7 tbl.3 (estimating that the
State of California is able to collect only four percent of the use taxes due on out-of-state vendors).
131. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
132. Matt Egan, Rise of Amazon Leaves Even More Retailers in Intensive Care, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 9, 2017, 11:33 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/06/investing/retail-stress-great-recessionamazon/index.html?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/U5WG-YCWS ] (“The report is a sobering reminder
of the consequences of the rise of e-commerce, especially Amazon . . . . ‘It’s been a downward
spiral for traditional retailers.’”).
133. See, e.g., Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 698, 114th Cong. (2015); Remote Transactions
Parity Act of 2015, H.R. 2775, 114th Cong.; Marketplace and Internet Tax Fairness Act, S. 2609,
113th Cong. (2014); Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013); Marketplace Fairness
Act, H.R. 684, 113th Cong. (2013); Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. (2011); Main
Street Fairness Act, S. 1452, 112th Cong. (2011); Marketplace Equity Act, H.R. 3179, 112th Cong.
(2011); Main Street Fairness Act, H.R. 2701, 112th Cong. (2011).
134. Isidore, supra note 129.
135. 987 N.E.2d 621, 625–27 (N.Y. 2013).
136. Id.
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decades, and it may be that the physical presence rule is outdated,” but
“[t]hat question, however, would be for the United States Supreme Court
to consider.”137 The court acknowledged that it was bound by precedent
and adjudicated the controversy under those Supreme Court precedents
that established the physical presence rule.138
Instead of disavowing the physical presence rule, the court found a
physical presence in an unlikely and controversial source: online
referrals made by other businesses with a physical presence.139 The court
reasoned that an in-state physical presence, while necessary, “need not
be substantial” and that the physical presence requirement would be
satisfied if economic activities performed in New York were performed
by the seller’s employees or on the seller’s behalf.140
The court noted the parallels between a mail-order business and an
online retailer.141 Both are able to maintain their operations without a
physical presence in a particular state.142 In fact, websites are designed to
reach a national audience from a single server “whose location is of
minimal import.”143 The difference, the court reasoned, was that the
statute “attached significance to the physical presence of a resident
website owner.”144 Websites are often predominantly geared toward
local audiences, so the physical presence of the website owner can be
relevant.145 The court described the relationship between Amazon,
Overstock, and the locally owned websites as providing Amazon and
Overstock with “an in-state sales force.”146 The court held that the
statute plainly satisfied the substantial nexus requirement because the
amount of revenue produced qualified as “demonstrably more than a
slightest presence.”147 Because a vendor was paying New York residents
to actively solicit business within New York, the court concluded that

137. Id. at 625.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 626.
140. Id. at 625–26.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (“Indeed, the Appellate Division record in this case contains examples of such websites
urging their local constituents to support them by making purchases through their Amazon links.”).
146. Id.
147. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (clarifying that a substantial nexus would certainly be
lacking if New York residents were merely engaged to post passive advertisements on their
websites).
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the vendor should shoulder the appropriate tax burden.148 The majority’s
opinion focused more on economic connections than it did on physical
presence.149 Amazon appealed the decision to the United States Supreme
Court, but the Court denied certiorari.150
This attenuated means of finding a physical presence through an
internet connection diminishes the physical presence rule’s appeal as a
“bright-line” guide to both businesses and states.151 Overstock represents
the first ever application of a use-tax to an out-of-state business without
a traditional physical presence within a state.152 Although the court in
Overstock justified this application by holding that there was a physical
presence, that physical presence was ultimately achieved through an
internet connection.153
III. THE FCC’S DESIGNATION OF THE INTERNET AS A
COMMON CARRIER
As discussed above, many courts have summarized the language in
Bellas Hess as the “physical presence” rule.154 However, there is more to
the rule than the physical presence requirement. The exact language of
the rule reads:
In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax
burdens on National in this case, we would have to repudiate
totally the sharp distinction . . . between mail order sellers with
retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, and those
148. Id. (noting that vendors are not required to pay these taxes out-of-pocket, but rather merely
collect the taxes and remit them to the state).
149. Id. at 625 (“The presence requirement will be satisfied if economic activities are performed
in New York by the seller’s employees or on its behalf.”).
150. Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 682
(2013). As of April 1, 2017, Amazon began collecting sales taxes nationwide. Mercado, supra note
128. This was due to the expansion of Amazon’s business model, particularly to emphasize sameday and next-day delivery, which has required Amazon to establish more distribution centers across
the country. See Isidore, supra note 129. Amazon would thus likely be subject to use taxation
collection obligations in the state of New York at this point, even without the court’s decision in
Overstock. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992); Darla Mercado, Despite
President Trump’s Tweet, Amazon Already Collects Sales Taxes, CNBC (June 28, 2017, 11:44
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/28/despite-president-trumps-tweet-amazon-already-collectssales-taxes.html [https://perma.cc/YGT3-Z7JQ].
151. Quill, 504 U.S. at 317.
152. See id. at 298; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Nat’l Bellas
Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
153. Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 625–26
(N.Y. 2013).
154. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 317; Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 625–26.
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who do no more than communicate with customers in the State
by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate
business.155
The Court “decline[d] to obliterate” this distinction.156
In determining whether a seller has a physical presence within a state
for use taxation purposes, courts often focus on whether the seller has a
physical presence within the state, rather than focusing on whether the
seller’s relationship with the state is conducted exclusively through mail
or common carrier.157 In the context of the more traditional economy,
this is unsurprising. Assuming that a seller had a physical presence
within a state, that would de facto ensure that the seller’s relationship
with that state went beyond communication through a common carrier.
In the context of the internet economy, however, and the decision in
Overstock, that language becomes more relevant.
In 2015, the FCC re-classified the internet as a common carrier.158
The FCC did so in order to promote net neutrality,159 “the principle that
Internet service providers (ISPs) should give consumers access to all
legal content and applications on an equal basis, without favoring some
sources or blocking others.”160 One scholar has pointed out that,
although “net neutrality is a highly charged term that means many
different things to many different people, the regulatory debate
surrounding net neutrality revolves around the statutory language of the
Communication Act, the Telecommunication Act, the FCC’s declaratory
rulings and orders, and the judicial decisions.”161 This Part discusses the
motivating forces behind the common carrier classification and the
context surrounding the common carrier classification both before and
after the FCC’s order.

155. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758 (emphasis added).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 317–18; Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 276–77.
158. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5615–16.
159. See infra section III.D.
160. Mike Snider et al., What Is Net Neutrality and What Does It Mean for Me?, USA TODAY
(Feb. 24, 2015, 8:04 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/02/24/net-neutrality-what-isit-guide/23237737/ [https://perma.cc/5MAB-9X4V].
161. Friedlander, supra note 12, at 908.
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Net Neutrality: The Motivation for the Internet’s Classification as
a Common Carrier

Network neutrality is “the principle that Internet service providers
(ISPs) should give consumers access to all legal content and applications
on an equal basis, without favoring some sources or blocking others.”162
The freedom of the internet has been debated broadly and encompasses
various concerns, “including fears of ISPs blocking access to certain
content for political, anti-competitive, or censorship reasons; vertically
integrated companies favoring or only allowing access to their
subsidiaries; and larger, more well-funded competitors denying market
entry to smaller sites.”163
Content creators such as Google and Netflix tend to support net
neutrality, because “[w]ithout network neutrality, these companies
would likely need to redesign their business models in order to
accommodate the added costs of doing business with unregulated
telecommunications providers.”164 Typical examples include Netflix and
YouTube because net neutrality rules prevent “fast lane” policies, which
require companies to pay to guarantee “competitive transmission
speeds.”165 Internet and general rights organizations, such as the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, SaveTheInternet, and the American
Civil Liberties Union also support net neutrality due to ideological
reasons.166 “[P]olicy reasons to support net-neutrality include concerns
about ISPs being able to block content for censorship or anti-competitive
reasons.”167
Telecommunication companies, however, tend to oppose net
neutrality.168 SBC Communications Inc. chairman, Edward E. Whitacre
162. Snider et al., supra note 160.
163. Friedlander, supra note 12, at 907–08.
164. Id. at 909.
165. See id. at 907 (citing Jon Brodkin, FCC Votes for Net Neutrality, a Ban on Paid Fast Lanes,
and Title II, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 26, 2015, 9:59 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/02/fccvotes-for-net-neutrality-a-ban-on-paid-fast-lanes-and-title-ii [https://perma.cc/9UCR-F2V3]). But
see Jeffrey Dorfman, Net Neutrality Puts Everyone in the Internet Slow Lane, FORBES (Feb. 27,
2015, 7:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2015/02/27/net-neutrality-putseveryone-in-the-internet-slow-lane/#15b2a2a29ab7 [https://perma.cc/FQ57-UJYC].
166. Friedlander, supra note 12, at 907–08 (citing Net Neutrality, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/MV9V-VBWK]; Take Action,
SAVE THE INTERNET, http://www.savetheinternet.com/sti-home [https://perma.cc/GJR6-6VSL];
What Is Net Neutrality?, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 2017), https://www.aclu.org/
feature/what-net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/2Q8V-5VBW]).
167. Id. at 909.
168. See id. at 910.
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Jr., compared SBC’s cable lines to “pipes” and commented that content
creators wanted to use his “pipes for free.”169 This debate prompted the
FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order, which subjected the internet to Title II
common carriage principles of the Telecommunications Act.170
B.

The FCC’s Regulatory Authority Was Unclear Before the
Internet’s Classification as a Common Carrier

Before the Open Internet Order, the FCC’s authority to regulate the
internet was questionable. In 2004, the FCC Chairman announced four
principles of internet freedom at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium in
Boulder, Colorado.171 These were (1) the “Freedom to Access Content”;
(2) the “Freedom to Use Applications;” (3) the “Freedom to Attach
Personal Devices;” and (4) the “Freedom to Obtain Service Plan
Information.”172
The FCC’s involvement in the net neutrality debate is regulatory in
nature.173 This debate involves the language of the Communication Act,
the Telecommunication Act, the FCC’s declaratory rulings and orders,
and judicial decisions.174
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,175 which began
to define the FCC’s ability to regulate the internet and provide a
framework for judicial oversight.176 The Court held that “(1) the
Chevron framework applied to the FCC’s construction of the
Telecommunications Act; (2) the FCC’s interpretation of
‘telecommunications service’ was a lawful construction of the Act under
Chevron; and (3) the FCC’s ruling was not arbitrary or capricious under
the Administrative Procedure Act.”177

169. Id. at 910 (quoting Arshad Mohammed, SBC Head Ignites Access Debate, WASH. POST
(Nov.
4,
2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/03/
AR2005110302211.html [https://perma.cc/C9HF-8VAK]).
170. 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5615–16.
171. Friedlander, supra note 12, at 915 (citing Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom:
Guiding Principles for the Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2004)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
176. Friedlander, supra note 12, at 916 (discussing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 974).
177. Id.
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After Brand X, “the FCC reclassified DSL Internet from a
telecommunications service to an information service.”178 Wireless
internet was classified as an information service, so all broadband ISPs
were free from common carrier regulation under Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934.179
In 2005, the FCC adopted four non-binding principles for the
“Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireline Facilities.”180 These principles stated that consumers were
entitled to access lawful internet content of their choice, run applications
and use services of their choice, and connect their choice of legal
devices that do not harm the network.181 They encouraged competition
among network providers, application and service providers, and content
providers.182 These goals represented the FCC’s attempt to create a net
neutrality regime after its policy statement in 2004.183 The FCC’s
authority to do so, however, was questionable.184
The FCC’s authority to regulate the internet was challenged in
Comcast v. FCC.185 The question before the Court was “whether the
Federal Communications Commission [had] authority to regulate an
Internet service provider’s network management practices.”186 The FCC
argued that it was exercising ancillary authority, which allows the FCC
to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue
such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in
the execution of [the FCC’s] functions.”187 Such an action must be
“‘reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective performance of its statutorily
mandated responsibilities.’”188 The D.C. Circuit held that the FCC had
“failed to tie its assertion of ancillary authority over Comcast’s internet
service to any ‘statutorily mandated responsibility.’”189 The FCC’s net
neutrality regime was thus defeated.

178. Id. at 919.
179. Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
180. Friedlander, supra note 12, at 919 (citing FCC Appropriate Framework for Broadband
Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 60222 (Oct. 17, 2005)).
181. Id. at 919.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
186. Id. at 644.
187. Id. at 644–45 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2012)).
188. Id. at 644 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
189. Id. at 661 (quoting Am. Library, 406 F.3d at 692).
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The 2010 Open Internet Order

After Comcast, in 2010, the FCC released the 2010 Open Internet
Order.190 The order “created two classes of Internet access: wired/fixed
and wireless.”191 Wired policies are stricter than wireless policies, likely
because wireless internet is still developing.192 The rules required (1)
transparency for fixed and mobile broadband providers; (2) a noblocking provision; and (3) an anti-discrimination rule for fixed
providers preventing them from unreasonably discriminating against
lawful network traffic.193
At the time, the internet was classified as an “information service.”194
The D.C. Circuit subsequently held that the FCC could not impose the
no-blocking or anti-discrimination limitations on the internet as a Title I
“information service” because these were common carrier regulations.195
We think it obvious that the Commission would violate the
Communications Act were it to regulate broadband providers as
common carriers. Given the Commission’s still-binding decision
to classify broadband providers not as providers of
“telecommunications services” but instead as providers of
“information services,” such treatment would run afoul of
section 153(51): “A telecommunications carrier shall be treated
as a common carrier under this [Act] only to the extent that it is
engaged in providing telecommunications services.” Likewise,
because the Commission has classified mobile broadband
service as a “private” mobile service, and not a “commercial”
mobile service, treatment of mobile broadband providers as
common carriers would violate section 332: “A person engaged
in the provision of a service that is a private mobile service shall
not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be treated as a
common carrier for any purpose under this [Act].”196

190. In re Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17931–66 (2010) [hereinafter 2010
Open Internet Order].
191. Friedlander, supra note 12, at 921 (citing the 2010 Open Internet Order).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 919 (citing In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853 (2005)) (noting that the FCC “essentially
categoriz[ed] all broadband ISPs as information service providers not subject to common carrier
regulation under Title II”).
195. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 650 (citations omitted).
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The Court ultimately concluded that the anti-blocking and antidiscrimination rules were, in fact, common carrier limitations.197
D.

The FCC Classifies the Internet as a Common Carrier in the 2015
Open Internet Order to Allow Stronger Regulations Promoting Net
Neutrality

The FCC addressed the problem identified by the Court in Verizon by
reclassifying the internet as a common carrier in the 2015 Open Internet
Order.198 “[T]he FCC stated that a net neutrality regime is necessary in
order to uphold the principles of an open Internet because broadband
providers are economically incentivized to, and actually capable of,
limiting Internet openness.”199 By classifying the Internet as a common
carrier, the FCC could promote net neutrality by passing regulations that
it was previously unable to enforce.200
The Open Internet Order has already been challenged in court. It is
possible that the new presidential administration, with the FCC headed
by Ajit Pai, may revoke the 2015 Open Internet Order and rescind the
internet’s classification as a common carrier.201 After President Trump’s
election in 2016, “Pai indicated that a top priority under the new
administration would be dismantling net neutrality. In a letter, he wrote
that he intended to ‘revisit . . . the Title II Net neutrality
proceeding . . . as soon as possible.’”202
This will be somewhat difficult, as an administration cannot revoke a
rule that has been implemented through proper notice and comment
proceedings without providing a reasoned analysis for the change.203 The
FCC has already proposed a rule that would remove the Title II
classification of ISPs, reclassifying the internet as an information
service.204 The decision to revoke the 2015 Open Internet Order would
be subject to hard look review by courts, which is a high standard used
to review the adequacy of an agency’s reasoning.205
197. Id.
198. 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5615–16.
199. Friedlander, supra note 12, at 924 (citing 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5635).
200. Id. at 923.
201. Jacob Kastrenakes, Trump’s New FCC Chief Is Ajit Pai, and He Wants to Destroy Net
Neutrality, VERGE (Jan. 23, 2017, 4:45 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2017/1/23/14338522/fccchairman-ajit-pai-donald-trump-appointment [https://perma.cc/DCE4-WXSZ].
202. Id.
203. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
204. In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 32 FCC Rcd. 4434, 4435 (2017).
205. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41.
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The comment period for the FCC’s proposed rule reversing the 2015
Open Internet Order closed on August 30, 2017.206 If the FCC votes to
pass a final rule changing the internet’s classification, and that rule
becomes effective, that action would have significant ramifications for
net neutrality practices. However, the impact of the 2015 Open Internet
Order, as well as the rescission of that order, on constitutional use
taxation has yet to be explored.
IV. IF THE INTERNET IS A COMMON CARRIER, IT CAN NO
LONGER BE USED AS A CONTACT THAT CAN ESTABLISH
A “SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS”
Since the Bellas Hess decision, and its re-affirmation in Quill, courts
have referred to the constitutional use taxation rule as the “physical
presence” rule.207 The Bellas Hess ruling upheld the distinction between
“mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a
State and those who do no more than communicate with customers in the
state by mail or common carrier.”208 Thus, under Bellas Hess, a seller
must have a physical presence within a state and connections with the
state beyond communication with customers within the state through
mail or common carrier in order to be subject to use taxation collection
obligations.209
The language “retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State” has
produced the “physical presence” shorthand, without much analysis of
the second clause: “and those who do no more than communicate with
customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general
interstate business.”210
Courts have not significantly analyzed the “common carrier”
language in the Bellas Hess decision.211 This Comment argues that this
language is significant given (1) the New York State Court of Appeals’
decision in Overstock and (2) the FCC’s treatment of the internet.

206. In re Restoring Internet Freedom, No. DA17-761, 2017 WL 3474062, at *1 (FCC Aug. 11,
2017).
207. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309–19 (1992); Overstock.com, Inc.
v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 625–26 (N.Y. 2013).
208. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
209. See id.
210. Id. (emphasis added).
211. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 315–18 (acknowledging Bellas Hess’s common carrier
language without analyzing it extensively); Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 625–26 (same).
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Courts Have Historically Ignored the “Common Carrier”
Language in Bellas Hess

In considering cases involving constitutional use taxation, courts have
historically focused on the “physical presence” aspect of the Bellas Hess
holding and ignored the common carrier language.212 In Quill, the Court
referred to the rule from Bellas Hess as both a “bright-line” rule and as a
“physical presence test.”213
The Court’s characterization of the rule as a bright-line rule or
physical presence test was essentially dicta, as the Court was not doing
anything to re-interpret the rule. Quill’s short hand designation of the
Bellas Hess rule as a “physical presence” rule and a “bright-line” were
useful references, but were not meant to add or take away any meaning
from Bellas Hess’s holding.214 The Court was explicitly re-affirming
Bellas Hess without altering its Commerce Clause analysis.215 Thus, the
Court’s designation of the Bellas Hess rule as a physical presence rule
did not eliminate the common carrier distinction articulated in Bellas
Hess.
Subsequent courts, intentionally or not, have similarly focused on the
physical presence aspect of the rule without analyzing the common
carrier provision.216 Only one court has held that physical presence is
sufficient, but not necessary, to establish a substantial nexus for taxation
purposes within a state.217
In Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa,218 the Ohio State Supreme Court
reasoned:
We hold today that although a physical presence in the state may
furnish a sufficient basis for finding a substantial nexus, Quill’s
holding that a physical presence is a necessary condition for
212. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 317–18; Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 625–26.
213. See Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
214. See id. at 317–18.
215. See id. at 301–02 (“[W]e must either reverse the State Supreme Court or overrule Bellas
Hess. While we agree with much of the state court’s reasoning, we take the former course.”). The
Court did overrule Bellas Hess’s Due Process Clause analysis. See id. at 308 (“We therefore agree
with the North Dakota Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not bar
enforcement of that State’s use tax against Quill.”).
216. See, e.g., Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1127 (2015); Borders
Online, LLC v. State Bd. of Equalization, 129 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1196 (2012); Overstock, 987
N.E.2d at 625–26. But see Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, __ Ohio St. 3d __, 2016-Ohio-7760, __
N.E.3d __, at ¶ 42 (holding that a physical presence is sufficient, but not necessary, to establish a
substantial nexus for taxation purposes).
217. Crutchfield, 2016-Ohio-7760, at ¶ 42.
218. See id.
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imposing the tax obligation does not apply to a businessprivilege tax such as the CAT, as long as the privilege is
imposed with an adequate quantitative standard that ensures that
the taxpayer’s nexus with the state is substantial.219
The court in Crutchfield was considering a business-privilege-tax, not
a use tax, so it is distinguishable from Quill and the other cases
discussed in this Comment.220 Quill was dealing specifically with use
taxation, which has a more direct impact on interstate commerce. The
Crutchfield court further explained that “the case law post-Complete
Auto establishes that for purposes of applying the four-prong Commerce
Clause test, business privilege taxes should be distinguished from
transaction taxes such as the sales and use tax.”221
The “common carrier” language has likely been lost in discussion of
the rule because historically, it has been superfluous. With traditional
business models, it was almost impossible to have a relationship with a
state exclusively through a common carrier while also establishing a
traditional physical presence. Requiring a physical presence within a
state and a relationship with that state through means other than common
carriers has historically been redundant; a physical presence almost by
definition indicated a connection beyond one through a common carrier.
With the exception of Overstock, no court has upheld a use tax on a
seller without a physical presence within the state. The physical presence
requirement is thus a well-established and accepted component of the
Bellas Hess rule.222 Although the common carrier component has
received less attention, it is relevant in the context of the modern internet
economy and the FCC’s designation of the internet as a common
carrier.223

219. Id. (emphasis in original).
220. Compare Crutchfield, 2016-Ohio-7760, at ¶ 3 (holding that physical-presence requirement
applicable to use-tax collection does not extend to business-privilege taxes), with Direct Marketing,
135 S. Ct. at 1127 (considering a use tax); Quill, 504 U.S. at 301 (same); Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at
625–26 (same); Borders Online, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 1184 (same).
221. Crutchfield, 2016-Ohio-7760, at ¶ 42.
222. See, e.g., Direct Marketing, 135 S. Ct. at 1127; Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 625–26; Borders
Online, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 1184. But see Crutchfield, 2016-Ohio-7760, at ¶ 42.
223. See, e.g., Direct Marketing, 135 S. Ct. at 1128 (involving use tax as applied to out-of-state
internet and catalog retailers); Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 623–26 (involving use tax that assumed
physical presence on the basis of online retailers’ sales volumes and online advertisers’ physical
presence); Borders Online, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 1196–97 (involving use tax as applied to out-ofstate internet retailer on the basis of its extensive cooperation with in-state brick-and-mortar
retailers). But see Crutchfield, 2016-Ohio-7760, at ¶ 3(declining to apply use tax physical presence
requirement to business-privilege taxes).
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The Current State of the Law: The Court’s Reasoning in Overstock
Is Impeded by the 2015 Open Internet Order

In Overstock, for the first time, a court found a physical presence
through the internet. The court reasoned that, although physical presence
is not typically associated with the internet because many websites are
designed to reach a national or global audience, New York’s statute
attached significance to the physical presence of the resident website
owner.224 The court noted that “[t]he presence requirement will be
satisfied if economic activities are performed in New York by the
seller’s employees or on its behalf.”225 Notably, the websites that
advertised on behalf of the retailers in Overstock, which did have a
physical presence in New York, were independent contractors with “no
employment relationship” with Amazon or Overstock. 226 The sellers’
only connections with these websites were thus their internet
advertisements, through internet links, for which the websites received
commission when they produced sales.
Although the court did find it to be significant that the out-of-state
sellers were paying commissions to in-state advertisers to solicit
customers, the connection between the sellers and the advertisers was in
the form of internet links.227 This is distinguishable from Scripto, where
the Supreme Court imposed use tax collection obligations on an out-ofstate seller that employed independent contractors to solicit sales within
the state.228 In Scripto, the independent contractors were individuals
located within the taxing state, who had the title of “salesman,” and who
were “furnished catalogs, samples, and advertising material, and [were]
actively engaged in Florida as [representatives]” of the seller.229 In
Overstock, the entirety of the relationship between the sellers and the
advertisers occurred over the internet, including the advertisers’
solicitation of customers.230

224. Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 625–26.
225. Id. at 625 (citing Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654 N.E.2d 954, 960–61 (N.Y. 1995)).
Although Orvis asserts that activity on the seller’s behalf, not necessarily by a direct employee, may
be sufficient, Orvis does not cite any federal cases that support this proposition.
226. Id. at 623.
227. Id. at 626 (describing the advertisers as an “in-state sales force” and observing that “no one
disputes that a substantial nexus would be lacking if New York residents were merely engaged to
post passive advertisements on their websites”).
228. Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 207–10 (1960)
229. Id. at 209.
230. Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 623.
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The Court did not analyze the “common carrier” language from
Bellas Hess.231 At the time that Overstock was decided in 2013, the FCC
had not yet designated the internet as a common carrier.232 The internet
was a viable means through which a seller could establish a physical
presence in a state without violating the Bellas Hess rule because the
internet was not considered a common carrier.233 Thus, a connection
established via the internet could be “more than communicat[ion] with
customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general
interstate business.”234
The FCC’s designation of the internet as a common carrier is directly
relevant to the second aspect of the Bellas Hess holding.235 If the internet
is a common carrier, then any connection through the internet is a
connection through a common carrier.
In Overstock, the Court reasoned that because a physical presence
“need not be substantial . . . . in the Internet world, many websites are
geared toward predominantly local audiences . . . such that the physical
presence of the website owner becomes relevant to Commerce Clause
analysis.”236
This may have been true in 2013, before the internet was a common
carrier.237 Now, however, a connection through the physical presence of
a website owner has become a connection via a common carrier.238 The
FCC’s designation of the internet as a common carrier therefore
precludes courts from finding a physical presence through an internet
connection.239
If the FCC had issued its 2015 Open Internet Order before the court’s
decision in Overstock, the court would not have been able to find a
physical presence through a relationship established solely over the
internet.240 The court was particularly concerned with adhering to
established Supreme Court precedent,241 which precludes finding a

231. See id. at 625–26.
232. It did not do so until 2015. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5615–16.
233. See Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 625–26.
237. It was not designated as such until 2015. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at
5615–16.
238. Id.
239. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
240. See Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 625–26.
241. See id. at 625.
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physical presence through a relationship limited to common carriers.242
The Overstock court supported its physical presence finding by holding
that the physical presence of affiliated web advertisers within the state
was sufficient to extend to Amazon and Overstock.243 Amazon’s and
Overstock’s connections to those web advertisers, however, were
entirely limited to the internet.244 The web advertisers also solicited
customers over the internet.245 The attenuated nature of Amazon’s and
Overstock’s relationships with New York, established solely through the
internet, would impede the Overstock court’s reasoning in light of the
FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order.
Now that the 2015 Open Internet Order has been promulgated, it
creates an avenue for litigants to argue against decisions such as the one
in Overstock. There are parties, such as state legislatures and traditional
brick-and-mortar retailers, that have interests in imposing use tax
collection obligations on internet retailers without traditional physical
presences in states in which they do business.246 The Open Internet
Order in conjunction with the rule established in Bellas Hess creates an
obstacle for such arguments. By designating the internet as a common
carrier, the FCC has precluded courts from finding a physical presence
through an internet connection under the current framework.
C.

The New Administration Attempts to Reverse the Open Internet
Order

As discussed in this Comment,247 the FCC designated the internet as a
common carrier for net neutrality purposes, not to impact the existing
use taxation framework.248 This Comment argues that that designation
potentially has unintended implications for the current constitutional use
taxation jurisprudence.249 The FCC’s designation, however, is an
administrative decision; the FCC can change it depending on the views
of the executive branch.250

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758; Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 625–26.
See Overstock, 987 N.E.2d at 625–26.
See id.
Id. at 622–23.
See supra section III.A.
See supra Part V.
See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5603; Friedlander, supra note 12, at 905.
See supra section IV.B.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 37 (1983).
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The FCC is an independent administrative agency, and as such, the
President has less direct control over its actions compared to executive
agencies.251 Although the FCC is “sheltered . . . from the President,” it is
not sheltered from politics.252 The FCC is composed of “five
commissioners appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, one of whom the President shall designate as
chairman.”253 The President’s appointment of commissioners allows him
to exert some influence over the agency.
President Barack Obama supported the FCC’s efforts toward net
neutrality.254 In particular, “President Obama asked the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to take up the strongest possible
rules to protect net neutrality, the principle that says Internet service
providers (ISPs) should treat all internet traffic equally.”255 President
Obama supported the effort to “reclassify consumer broadband services
under what’s known as Title II of the Telecommunications Act.”256 The
White House acknowledged that “[u]ltimately, the FCC is an
independent agency and the decision is theirs alone.”257 The FCC
received nearly four million comments as part of the comment period
surrounding this rule, with “overwhelming support” for the internet’s
reclassification.258
In 2017, Donald Trump became the President of the United States.259
President Trump is less supportive of net neutrality.260 In 2014, President
251. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009) (“The independent
agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been observed that
their freedom from Presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased
subservience to congressional direction.”); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628–30
(1935).
252. See Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 523.
253. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
254. See Ezra Mechamber, President Obama Urges FCC to Implement Strong Net Neutrality
Rules, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 10, 2014, 9:15 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
blog/2014/11/10/president-obama-urges-fcc-implement-stronger-net-neutrality-rules [https://perma.
cc/8A2J-J64W].
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Matt Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Is Elected President in Stunning
Repudiation of the Establishment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/
09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html?mcubz=2 [https://perma.cc/RN2HSEHG].
260. See Klint Finley, This Is the Year Donald Trump Kills Net Neutrality, WIRED (Jan. 2, 2017,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/year-donald-trump-kills-net-neutrality/ [https://perma.
cc/Q7JA-R34F].
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Trump tweeted “Obama’s attack on the internet is another top down
power grab. Net neutrality is the Fairness Doctrine. Will target
conservative media.”261 Immediately after his election, Donald Trump’s
transition team indicated its opposition to net neutrality.262 Some
members of the Republican Party are similarly opposed, as “[t]he two
Republican FCC commissioners have already vowed to overturn the
FCC’s current net neutrality rules and other regulations.”263
The evidence suggests that the internet’s common carrier status may
change soon.264 It is possible that Congress may intervene.265 Without
intervention from Congress, however, as discussed above in this
Comment, President Trump’s administration may not revoke the rule
without a reasoned analysis and a new notice and comment process.266
The FCC, however, has already begun the formal process to rescind the
2015 Open Internet Order.267
On May 23, 2017, the FCC released a notice of proposed rulemaking
that would reverse the 2015 Open Internet Order.268 This rule would
remove the regulations placed on the internet under the 2015 Open
Internet Order and “end the utility-style regulatory approach that gives
government control of the Internet.”269 Specifically, this rule would
remove the Title II classification of ISPs that subjects them to common
carrier regulations, and would reclassify the internet as an information
service.270
This rule, however, is not yet final. The comment period for the rule
ended on August 30, 2017,271 and depending on the comments, the FCC
may choose to abandon the process, adopt a final rule developed in light
261. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 12, 2014, 10:58 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/532608358508167168?lang=en [https://perma.cc/F794TTTS].
262. Jon Brodkin, Trump’s Latest FCC Advisor Opposes Title II, Supports Data Cap
Exemptions, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 30, 2016, 9:27 AM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2016/11/trump-appoints-another-net-neutrality-opponent-to-oversee-fcc/ [https://perma.cc/
9Z4U-DXMJ].
263. Finley, supra note 260.
264. See Restoring Internet Freedom Act, S. 993, 115th Cong. (2017); Brodkin, supra note 262;
Finley, supra note 260; Trump, supra note 261.
265. See Restoring Internet Freedom Act, S. 993, 115th Cong. (2017).
266. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
267. In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 32 FCC Rcd. 4434, 4435 (2017).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 4435–36.
270. Id. at 4441.
271. In re Restoring Internet Freedom, No. DA17-761, 2017 WL 3474062, at *1 (F.C.C. Aug.
11, 2017).
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of the comments, or begin the process over again. Even if the FCC does
adopt a final rule reclassifying the internet, however, the rule likely will
not take effect for at least sixty days following its publication, allowing
time for litigants to challenge the rule.272 It is thus unclear whether, how,
or when the internet’s common carrier status will change.
A reversal of the Open Internet Order would potentially enable the
reasoning that the court relied upon in Overstock given that the internet
would no longer be a common carrier. The internet’s role in the current
constitutional use taxation framework thus depends on the actions of the
FCC from administration to administration.
CONCLUSION
The FCC’s designation of the internet as a common carrier has
potentially precluded courts from finding that sellers have a physical
presence within a state through internet connections for use taxation
purposes.273 This change highlights the relevance of the second half of
the rule established in Bellas Hess that a physical presence requires
connections beyond common carrier because it precludes the internet
from being a means through which a seller can establish a taxable
connection with a state.274 More specifically, this precludes the New
York Court of Appeals’ holding in Overstock and re-enforces a more
traditional, bright-line physical presence rule in the context of the
internet economy.275 This change, however, may be fleeting, as it could
be reversed by the Trump administration.276

272. See generally OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS,
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GQS2-FE4K].
273. See supra Part V.
274. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
275. See Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 625–26
(N.Y. 2013).
276. See In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 32 FCC Rcd. 4434, 4435 (2017).

